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Abstract
In an effort to require electric utilities to assess the environmental impacts of
their activities, public utilities commissions nationwide have been turning to
the use of environmental externality valuation as a tool in integrated resource
planning. To date, policy discussions have focused predominantly upon the
correct value and calculation of externality adders, rather than their use and
applicability as a planning tool. This paper discusses the use and utility of
externality valuation for identifying low-cost, low-emissions electric service
strategies. Using data obtained from a broad based examination of New
England's electric service options, this paper compares the externality valuation
concepts with the information generally obtained from electric power system
simulation and production-costing analyses. While a valid economic concept,
the application of externality values is of little use in identifying which
strategies are both low-cost and low-emissions, or the specific policy options
required to ensure their implementation. Externality valuation should
therefore be used only as a last step, to select from among low-cost, low-
emissions strategies once the aggregate cost and emissions impacts of those
strategies have been identified.
Introduction
Across the nation, state regulatory agencies are employing the economic
principle of externalities in an effort to ensure that decisions, made in electric
utility resource acquisitions, reflect the true or social cost of electric service.
Social cost refers to all the costs associated with the production and delivery of a
good or service. By including the uncosted components of electric service in
the resource planning and acquisition processes, it is hoped that an electric
power system which is "least cost to society" will be identified and
implemented. To date, the uncosted components of greatest interest have been
those associated with environmental damages.
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A recent report by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), entitled
Environmental Externalities: An Overview of Theory and Practice, provides a
good overview of the recent initiatives regarding externalities, their
evaluation, and use in planning. (EPRI 1991) The theory of social cost
evaluation, and the use of externalities as a policy option in that process, are
discussed by Connors in a recent report. (Connors 1991c) As the EPRI report
discusses, one of the environmental externality valuation techniques focuses
on quantifying, or finding some reasonable proxy for the actual damage costs
associated with pollutant emissions. This "monetization" of environmental
externalities had been implemented in several states such as Massachusetts,
California, and Nevada.
Monetization of environmental externalities has generally been achieved by
multiplying the emissions associated with a resource by an environmental
adder ($/ton-pollutant). This cost is then added to the cost of the resources
prior to overall resource evaluation and selection. Table One provides some
examples of monetized externality values recently selected by several states
(hereafter called just externality values, or externalities).
Table One: Monetized Externality Values for Three States
Pollutant Mass. California Nevada % Range
Emission DPU PUC PSC in Values
Sulfur Dioxide $1,500 $12,960 $1,560 88.4
Nitrogen Oxides $6,500 $13,060 $6,800 50.2
Carbon Dioxide $22 $8 $22 63.6
Suspended Particulates $4,000 $8,780 $4,180 54.4
(1989$/ton) (1990$/ton) (1990$/ton) (%)
(California 1991; Massachusetts 1990; Nevada 1991)
While externality values have been selected, and justified based upon the
estimation of damage costs, or past expenditures to reduce emissions, how
effective are they as a tool to identify strategies that are "least cost to society?"
This paper will explore this question three ways. First, an overview of the
types of information communicated by externalities and systemwide analysis,
and what they add to the evaluation of resources and resource portfolios in a
least-social-cost framework. Second, for one region's electric power system,
New England, how do externality values, selected using costs from specific
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projects, compare with the cost of reducing emissions that can estimated using
industry-standard production-costing models (systemwide analysis). Finally,
how effective are externality values, when used within systemwide analysis, at
identifying "least social cost" strategies.
Externality Values and Systemwide Evaluation
The externality value, as a tool in evaluating whether resources or strategies
are of least social cost, is an odd numeraire. First, its units ($/unit-emission)
are those of a rate, and therefore do not communicate the overall external costs,
or emission involved in the evaluation. An externality's derivation requires a
rather complete understanding of the environmental impacts of pollutant
emissions, and their resulting costs-in dollars-to society. In many instances
this information is absent, or very difficult to assess in a reliable fashion. The
range of values in Table One attests to this. In the derivation of their
externality values, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Mass.
DPU) recognized this quantitative uncertainty, and set standards for the
selection of externality values as follows:
(1) where feasible, comprehensive damage costs provide the most
appropriate values for decision making purposes;
(2) where marginal cost of damage is not available, cost of control is the best
available proxy until the cost of damage can be assessed more accurately;
(3) where available, the marginal cost of control incurred to meet emission
limits mandated by society should be used to determine the value of
pollutants or pollution abatement.
(Massachusetts 1991, pp. 42-43)
This approach (3) has been referred to as the "implied valuation method." It
equates the cost of meeting new or existing environmental regulations with
society's value, or willingness-to-pay to avoid that emission. (Chernick and
Caverhill 1991) While this may be true, within a least-social-cost framework
what society is willing-to-pay is not the issue; what is the-least-that-must-be-
paid is. Setting the price of a service equal to the recipients' value is the logic
applied to free and open markets. In a regulated environment, particularly one
where there is an obligation to serve, the price of the service has traditionally
been based upon a supplier's costs rather than a customer's value for that
service. Shouldn't this be the case when evaluating social costs as well? This
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long-standing approach of basing the price of electric service upon its cost,
rather than its value, has been used to guard consumers against the possible
misuse of monopoly power. The transformation of utility resource planning
from least-cost to least-societal-cost should maintain this consumer safeguard.
The question remains however; how do we assess the external, social costs of
pollutant emissions if the damage costs are unknown or highly uncertain?
Clearly, knowing how much, or little, we would have to pay to reduce
emissions provides a better position to judge our willingness-to-pay than what
we had to pay to meet highly constrained-with respect to implementation-
regulatory emissions limits. Furthermore, under the least-social-cost
framework we should exhaust all opportunities to reduce costs and emissions
before entertaining the question of how much we are willing-to-pay for further
emission reductions.
One way to approach this issue is to examine the type of information required
to assess the cost and emissions reduction opportunities available. Figure One
displays a stylized tradeoff graph showing a variety of strategies with varying
costs and emissions (in this example, Nitrogen Oxides-NOx). Each point on
the graph represents a mix of new and existing resources, which when used to
provide electric service over a certain time period yields a cost (internal),
shown on the y-axis, and a level of emissions (NOx), shown on the x-axis.
What is clear, even without the use of social costs and externalities, is that, for
any two strategies, if one has lower costs and emissions (holding all else
constant) it is superior, and in the nomenclature of multiple-attribute analysis,
dominates the more expensive, higher polluting strategy. By successive
pairwise comparisons we can eliminate from consideration all strategies that
have higher costs and emissions than any other. What remains is a collection
of strategies called the "Decision Set" which, when connected by a line, form a
"tradeoff curve."
Each strategy along the tradeoff curve represents a collection of resources which
in combination result in a least-cost and emissions strategy. Moving along the
tradeoff curve from right to left describes the most cost-effective ways to reduce
emissions1. By comparing strategies along the tradeoff curve we can calculate
1 For the collection of options, and sequence of future events evaluated.
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the cost incurred (internalized) by requiring, or desiring, lower emissions. The
shape of the tradeoff curve informs us as to way costs increase as emissions are
reduced.
Figure One: The Evaluation of Strategies using Systemwide Analysis Alone
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We can superimpose upon Figure One the effects of externality valuation.
Using the logic of the Massachusetts decision, society is willing to pay an
additional $6500 per ton of avoided NOx emissions. Therefore, any strategy
which has higher direct, or internal, cost of electric service-at a rate of $6500 per
ton of NOx avoided-is of equivalent social cost. Beginning with any strategy
on the tradeoff graph, we can draw a line rising up and to the left with a slope
equal to the externality value. All strategies on this curve are, by definition, of
equal social cost.
Figure Two shows such a line, referred to here as an equivalent social cost
curve. To draw this curve we have had to make some assumptions. The
selection of an externality value does not tell us from where to begin our
comparisons. Therefore, we have to assume a starting point. In Figure Two,
the equivalent social cost curve originates at 'a', the minimum level of
emissions to be in compliance with environmental regulations, at a cost equal
to the least-cost strategy along the tradeoff curve ('e'). This starting point was
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selected to be in line regulatory requirements-prior to the application of social
cost theory-such that costs are minimized while meeting environmental
standards.
Figure Two: Externality Valuation in the Context of
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Since strategies 'a', 'b', 'c" and 'd' all lie upon the equivalent social cost curve,
they all have the same social cost. Implicit in the use of externality values is
the assumption that any strategy of equivalent social cost, and lower emissions,
will be the one selected in resource acquisition process. The internalization of
the cost difference between strategies 'a' and 'd', independent of its magnitude,
is justified since it reflects a more equitable distribution of social costs,
collecting them from the beneficiaries of the service, rather than those who
would otherwise bear the brunt of the environmental damage.
Two important aspects in the use of externalities relate to when and what they
are applied, during the course of analysis. If the valuation of externalities is
performed upon specific options, rather than the overall performance of the
system, then resources may be selected without knowing whether the system
will end up at 'b', 'c' or 'd'. Notice that employing externality values pushes
decisions towards the upper-left corner of the tradeoff graph, when "least-
social-cost" resides in the lower-left corner.
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Unlike the equivalent social cost curve, the tradeoff curve describes the most
cost-effective ways to reduce emissions. It is based solely upon the evaluation
of the power system's performance for a range of feasible options. A "cost-
effective emissions reduction rate" can be calculated between any two points on
the tradeoff curve (in $/pollutant-emission-avoided). In calculating this rate,
the actual cost increase (internal), and emission reduction for that pollutant are
known. Furthermore, the costs internalized can be considered a maximum,
since the entire cost difference between the two strategies may not be
attributable exclusively to the reduction of that emission.
Comparing Cost-Effective Emissions Reductions
with Externality Valuation
How well do externality values compare to the cost-effective emission
reduction rates derived from systemwide analysis? As part of their ongoing
work with THE NEW ENGLAND PROJECT: Analyzing Regional Electricity
Alternatives 2, (NEPOOL 1991) the Analysis Group for Regional Electricity
Alternatives (AGREA) at the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory has evaluated the
performance of New England's electric power system for a broad range of
strategies.
Using information obtained from individual New England utilities, NEPOOL,
EPRI and other sources, and using EPRI's EGEAS production costing model, the
NEPOOL Load Forecasting Model, as well as a capacity planning module
AGREA developed themselves, the M.I.T. research team has simulated the
operation of New England's electric power system for a broad range of
strategies. In all, 288 individual strategies were evaluated across fifteen
combinations of load growth and fuel prices (for a total of 4320 simulations).
For each simulation, data was recorded that tracked the costs, emissions, fuel
consumption, reliability, and load and capacity growth for a twenty year period
(1990-2009). By comparing the performance of these strategies, least-cost, least-
2 THE NEW ENGLAND PROJECT: Analyzing Regional Electricity Alternatives is
research project at the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory which brings together utility executives,
regulators, consumer and environmental interest groups, and other stakeholders in New
England's electric power industry to discuss the issues facing, and long-term strategies
available to, the region. It is funded by a consortium of New England's electric utilities.
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emissions strategies can be identified, and cost-effective emissions reduction
rates calculated.
Each strategy is a combination of five separate components;
1) a choice of new generation technologies (technology mix),
2) a choice of the level and relative contribution of conservation and peak
load management (DSM),
3) the persistence of existing capacity in the system, and how-if applicable-it
is replaced (existing capacity treatment),
4) the choice of fuel in existing residual oil-fired units (boiler fuel
switching), and
5) the desired level of extra capacity to have available (reserve margin).
Table Two shows the options available within each component. Exhaustively
combining all the components' options yields 288 separate strategies. In the
analysis, no effort is made beforehand to determine which strategies perform
better than others. Simulation results themselves communicate which
strategies were less expensive and had lower emissions. Examination of these
strategies in detail can inform decisionmakers as to which options to stress or
discourage in actual resource procurement.
Table Two: Strategy Components and Options
INumber of Strategies 288
[New Technology Mix 4 Existing Capacity Treatment 3
Gas/Oil Dependent Life Extension
Gas/Oil & Clean Coal Scheduled Retirement
Clean Coal Dependent Repower Existing
Gas/Oil & Nuclear
[Boiler Fuel Choice-Residual 2
Demand-Side Management 6 1990 Fuel Choice
1990 Utility DSM Programs 0.5% Sulfur Oil 6
Double 1990 Programs
Triple Conservation [Target Reserve Margin 2
Triple Peak Management Default 23%
No Utility Demand-Side Mgt. Higher 30%
Technical Potential
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Figure Three shows the performance of a selection strategies for the measures
of direct cost and cumulative sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, for a future with a
pessimistic economy/low load forecast, and medium oil and natural gas prices
(the '"PM" future)3. Direct costs are defined as the total cost stream associated
with the provision of electric service in New England, discounted at the rate of
inflation to 1989 dollars4. (NEPLAN 1989) Direct costs include customer as well
as utility expenditures for conservation measures. The external, societal costs
of emissions are not included in the direct cost calculation.
Figure Three shows results from two of the six levels of Demand-Side
Management; the Double 1990 Programs, and the Triple Conservation levels of
DSM. These two classes of strategies have been selected because they
consistently had lower direct costs than the other levels of DSM5. The
difference in costs and range of S02 emissions among the strategies of like DSM
is due to the other four strategy components described in Table Two. The broad
range of S02 emissions exhibited for each level of DSM emphasizes the need to
develop integrated strategies.
We can compare the environmental externality values selected by the Mass.
DPU with the cost-effective emission reduction rates, described by the tradeoff
curve, by superimposing equivalent social cost curves (with slopes of $1500/ton
SO2) upon the tradeoff graph. A tradeoff, and equivalent social cost curve has
been drawn for each of the two DSM levels since the feasibility at the assumed
costs of these two levels of DSM is unknown. The equivalent social cost curves
originate at seven million tons of S02. This twenty-year, New England-wide
SO2 emissions cap (total emissions allowable 1990-2009) was estimated by
applying federal and state sulfur dioxide regulations to historical New England
utility fossil fuel consumption.
3 The PM future has been selected for discussion because, of the fifteen futures used in the
simulations, it most closely matches the long-term load growth trend contained in the 1991
NEPOOL CELT Report. (NEPOOL, 1991)
4 Many of the assumptions regarding technology characteristics, and cost escalation
factors were taken from the December 1989 NEPOOL Generation Task Force Report. (NEPLAN,
1989)
5 It is important to note that while it is possible to simulate a given level of demand-
side management, such as Triple Conservation, whether such an option can be implemented, at
the assumed costs, is not known.
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For both these levels of demand-side management, there are cost-effective
emissions reduction rates below the Mass. DPU rate of $1500/ton SO2. The first
pair of strategies for the Double 1990 Programs level has an emissions
reduction rate of $1325/ton. Similarly, the cost-effective emissions reduction
rates between the first two strategies ($667/ton), and the first and third strategies
($1281/ton) on the Triple Conservation tradeoff curve are also lower than the
Mass. DPU number.6 (EIA 1991)
Evaluating the relative performance of strategies in this manner provides a set
of information usually not available when attempting to develop externality
values directly via technology or market based assessments. Using this
approach, the absolute changes in direct costs and emissions obtained when
one strategy or portfolio is chosen over another becomes known. Table Three
summarizes the changes in direct costs, sulfur dioxide emissions, and
emissions reduction rates for sulfur dioxide, for strategies along the Triple
Conservation tradeoff curve. Comparisons are made between each strategy and
the strategy at the rightmost (lowest cost) end of the tradeoff curve ("A"), and
then again from the emissions cap ("Cap"), identified in Figure Three.
As can be seen, cost increases along the tradeoff curve are modest (on a
percentage basis) for this set of scenarios. The direct cost increase between
strategies "A" and "B" for the entire twenty year period is only 0.5%, or 0.02%
per year for twenty years. In absolute terms however these are large cost
increases, over one billion dollars total, or fifty-one million dollars per year (for
the New England region's entire system). There are, however, sizable SO2
emission reductions. By choosing strategy "B" instead of "A", an additional 3.6
million tons of S02 emissions are avoided. This is an additional 30%
reduction, lowering total SO2 emissions to below half the seven million ton
emissions cap estimated for the 1990 Clean Air Act. Note that all except one of
the cost-effective emissions reduction rates calculated in Table Three fall below
the Department's $1500/ton S02 externality value.
6 Although we can superimpose an equivalent social cost curve onto a tradeoff graph, we
cannot move with the use of externality values, or any other methodology, between any two
strategies on the graph. To arrive at point "B" instead of "A" requires adding resources to the
existing system, over a twenty year period, consistent with "B's" strategy.
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Figure Three: Cost-Effective Emissions Reductions vs.
Equivalent Social Costs for S02 Emissions (Emissions Cap Comparison)
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Table Three: Cost and Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Comparison -
Triple Conservation Decision Set
(B$'89) (Million Tons) (B$'89) (%-20 yr.) (%-1 yr.)
(Million Tons) '(%-20 yr.) (Million Tons)
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Decision Total Cumulative Change in Direct Costs vs. A
Set Direct Sulfur Delta % Total % Change
Strategy Costs Dioxide Direct Direct Annual
Emissions Costs Costs Average
Cap 206.2 7.00 - - -
A 206.12 4.95 -
B 207.14 3.42 1.02 0.49 0.02
C 208.24 3.29 2.12 1.03 0.05
D 210.78 3.26 4.66 2.26 0.11
Decision Change in Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Cost-Effective
Set vs. Cap vs. A Emissions Reduction
Strategy Delta % Change Delta % Change Rates
Emissions I Emissions Emissions Emissions vs. Cap I vs. A
Cap - - -
A 2.05 -29.33 - - $0 -
B 3.58 -51.19 153 -30.93 $285 $667
C 3.71 -52.98 1.66 -33.46 $572 $1,281
D 3.74 -53.44 1.69 -34.12 $1,246 $2,761
(%-20 yr.) ($89/ton)
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The emission reduction rates in Table Three assume that all the increases in
direct costs were used to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions. Similar calculations
can be done for nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon dioxide (CO2), and other
emissions. Figures Four and Five compare the tradeoff curves for direct costs
and NOx and CO2 emissions, with the equivalent social cost curves based on
externality values of $6500/ton NOx, and $22/ton CO2. The starting points for
the equivalent social cost curves are positioned at what NOx and C02 emissions
would be if New England-wide emissions from the electric sector were held
constant at 1989 levels7. The accompanying changes in costs, emissions and
cost-effective emissions reduction rates are presented in Tables Four and Five.
As can be seen, there are cost-effective emissions reduction strategies which fall
well below the equivalent social cost lines for NOx and C02 offering substantial
reductions in these emissions as well. The lowest-cost, highest-emissions
strategy on the NOx Triple Conservation tradeoff curve ("I") has emissions
22% lower than constant New England-wide NOx emissions limit. The
amount of NOx reductions that the 1990 Clean Air Act will require from the
New England electric power sector has not yet been decided. Reductions in (as
yet unregulated) carbon dioxide reach 16% before direct costs begin to climb
sharply. In both cases, the cost-effective emissions reduction rates between the
twenty-year 1989 limit for NOx and C02 emissions, and the first three strategies
along each tradeoff curve, fall below the Mass DPU values of $6500/ton NOx
and $22/ton C02.
Developing cost-effective emissions reduction functions from the data obtained
through systemwide analysis allows us to inform ourselves, and society, about
our options for reducing emissions. Figure Six compares the direct cost
increases with the percent reduction in emissions, using the Mass. DPU
externality values, and for the cost-effective emissions reduction results
presented in Figures Three through Five. As can be seen, sizable reductions in
emissions can be obtained at costs significantly less than those allowable with
the use of the DPU's externality values-even when the total change in direct
costs between two strategies is being attributed to reducing a single emission.
7 Approximately 3.1 million tons for NOx, and 1100 million tons for C02. (EIA, 1991)
AGREA - MIT ANALYSIS GROUP FOR REGIONAL ELECrRICT ALTERNATIVES (MIT-EL 92-001WP, 1/10/92 Pg. 12)
Figure Four: Cost-Effective Emissions Reductions vs. Equivalent
Social Costs for NOx Emissions (Flat Emissions Limit Comparison)
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Table Four: Cost and Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Comparison -
Triple Conservation Decision Set
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Decision Total Cumulative Change in Direct Costs vs. I
Set Direct Nitrogen Delta % Total % Change
Strategy Costs Oxides Direct Direct Annual
Emissions Costs Costs Average
Limit 206.12 3.10
I 206.12 2A1 - - -
J 208.24 234 2.12 1.03 0.05
K 210.78 2.32 4.66 2.26 0.11
L 227.70 2.24 21.58 10.47 0.50
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Decision Change in Nitrogen Oxides Emissions Cost-Effective
Set vs. Limit vs. I Emissions Reduction
Strategy Delta % Change Delta % Change Rates
Emissions I Emissions Emissions I Emissions vs. Limit I vs.I
Limit - - -
I 0.69 -22.23 - - $0 -
J 0.76 -24.48 0.07 -2.90 $2,793 $30,286
K 0.79 -25.32 0.10 -3.98 $5,936 $48,542
L 0.86 -27.87 0.18 -7.26 $24,977 $123,314
(%-20 yr.) ($89/ton)
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Figure Five: Cost-Effective Emissions Reductions vs. Equivalent
Social Costs for C02 Emissions (Flat Emissions Limit Comparison)
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Table Five: Cost and Carbon Dioxide Emissions Comparison -
Triple Conservation Decision Set
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Decision Total Cumulative Change in Direct Costs vs. M
Set Direct Carbon Delta % Total % Change
Strategy Costs Dioxide Direct Direct Annual
Emissions Costs Costs Average
Limit 206.07 1100.0
M 206.07 1041.8 - - -
N 206.12 921.2 0.05 0.02 0.00
O 208.24 919.3 2.17 1.05 0.05
P 227.70 869.6 21.63 10.50 0.50
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M 5820 -5.29 - - $0.0 -
N 178.80 -16.25 120.60 -11.58 $0.3 $0.4
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Identifying the Characteristics of a Least-Social-Cost Strategy
In this section we will look at the effectiveness of externality valuation in
identifying least-cost, least-emissions strategies by converting the direct costs in
the above strategies to social costs, using the Mass. DPU externality values.
Since many strategies may reduce several emissions simultaneously, it would
be helpful if the portion of the direct cost increase attributable to a single
emission's reduction could be calculated. This is difficult to do without a
detailed analysis of what occurred in each scenario to introduce low emissions
resources, and displace high emissions ones. One way to allocate the relative
contribution of each emission's reduction to total system performance is use
externality values to convert direct costs to social costs, thereby collapsing
several emissions into the cost attribute. While this hides the relative
reduction of individual emissions, it allows us to look at the overall
performance of a strategy across emissions.
Figure Seven shows how strategies' positions shift when direct costs are
converted into social costs. Figure Seven takes the Double 1990 Programs and
Triple Conservation DSM strategies, and adds to the direct cost of those
strategies the environmental externality costs associated with the change in
emissions from a 1988 emissions baseline. The New England Project data
includes annual emissions for SO2, NOx, CO2 and Total Suspended Particulates
(TSP). For SO2, NOx, and CO2, the externality value for each emission was
multiplied by the annual emissions-simulated in the model run-minus 1988
electric sector emissions. This emissions cost is then added to the direct cost to
obtain the social cost for that strategy8. Since no historical reference data was
readily available for suspended particulates, changes in particulate emissions
were calculated against the emissions in the first year of the production costing
model run.
Because social costs are calculated based upon net emissions, any strategy which
reduces emissions relative to the baseline receives an environmental credit,
8 The externality value can be multiplied by total systems emissions as well. However,
since Mass. DPU focused on the net system impacts associated with resource additions, and that
the use of total versus delta emissions only serves to shift the entire group of strategies upwards
in cost, the delta emissions approach has been used in this discussion.
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and therefore a social cost less than its direct cost. Figure Seven demonstrates
this point. The transformation of direct costs to social costs shifts the set of data
points counter-clockwise. Strategies with lower SO2 (and other) emissions shift
down, and high emissions strategies shift up as environmental costs are added
to direct costs.
Figure Seven: Direct Cost vs. Social Cost Comparison
for Two Levels of Demand-Side Management
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Shifting strategies on the left-down, and on the right-up, may be an accurate
representation of the relative social cost of these strategies, but this knowledge
adds little to the decisionmaking process since those strategies which had low
direct costs and low emissions to begin, end up having low social costs and
emissions as well.
Strategies in the direct cost decision sets reappear in decision sets for the social
cost and emissions comparisons. Figures Eight and Nine illustrate this point.
In Figure Eight, for direct costs and sulfur dioxide emissions, strategies with
both Triple Conservation and Repowering of existing units are highlighted.
This collection of strategies (with varying technology mixes, boiler fuel choice,
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and reserve margins) has a tendency to remain on or near the tradeoff curves
for a range of costs and emissions, and across the range of load growths and fuel
price uncertainties analyzed for the The New England Project.
Figure Eight: Performance of Repowering and Triple Conservation
Strategies for Direct Costs and S02 Emissions
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The repowering component of these strategies promotes supply-side efficiency
improvements faster than relying upon capacity additions that meet
incremental new load alone. Similarly, additional cost competitive
conservation programs increase the efficiency at which electricity is used by
upgrading existing electricity customers, and ensuring that new end-users are
of a higher efficiency as well. It was found that by looking at the relative
performance of the 288 strategies, that the cost and C02 reductions achieved
through increased conservation were complemented by a relatively cost-
neutral repowering strategy that substantially reduced SO2 and NOx emissions.
Because these coordinated strategies reduce both costs and emissions, when
their direct costs are converted to social costs they remain in the decision set.
Figure Nine highlights the same strategies as in Figure Eight, but with social
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p
costs replacing direct costs on the vertical axis. As can be seen, the strategies
emphasizing complementary supply-side and demand-side efficiency
improvements remain in the low cost, low emissions corner.
Figure Nine: Performance of Repowering and Triple Conservation
Strategies for Social Costs and S02 Emissions
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Papers by Andrews and Connors take a detailed look at the existing New
England electric industry and explore the dynamics between existing resources
and new, in developing low cost and emissions strategies. (Andrews 1991;
Andrews and Connors 1991; Connors 1991a; Connors 1991b) As these papers
show, placing too great an emphasis on either supply-side or demand-side
resources can lead to an unbalanced strategy. Failure to coordinate
conservation initiatives with supply-side efficiency improvements can have
perverse impacts, as older generating capacity-inferior to new generating
technologies in both efficiency and environmental characteristics-is not
displaced, keeping emissions high.
What do the analytic trends described here imply for the use of externality
values in resource planning? What is clear from the above results is that the
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use of such values does not identify which combinations of resources result in
low cost, low emissions strategies. Although society might be willing to pay
substantially more to reduce emissions, it would prefer to pay less and have
lower emissions. Performing detailed analysis which allows the interactions
among new resources and the existing system to be modeled is essential to
provide the data necessary for determining which strategies consistently
perform well for both cost and emissions.
Where externality values can play an important role is in deciding which of the
least-cost, least-emissions strategy-identified through a broad-based set of
detailed analyses-should be pursued. Here a problem arises as well.
Externality values do not communicate the level of direct costs that will
become internalized, and therefore collected through electricity rates as a result
of their application. Nor do they communicate the expected level of reduced
emissions.
In deciding which "value society places on pollution control," regulators
should make their decisions with the knowledge of the resulting costs, and
level of emissions reduction that will result from any such valuation, whether
those costs are associated with continued emissions, or acting to avoid their
release.
Conclusions
In an effort to get electric utilities to include environmental impacts in their
planning, regulators have begun to rely upon the use of environmental
externalities in resource planning and acquisition. Without good information
on the damage costs associated with pollutant emissions, they have turned to
other methods of external cost estimation. Such methods as the "implied
valuation technique," are justifiable from a historical cost, and solid data
perspective. They have several shortcomings however. Selection of a rate is
uninformative as to the aggregate direct, internal cost and emissions impacts
associated with their use. Furthermore, they fail to identify, describe or
promote those strategies which concurrently reduce emissions and costs.
Systemwide analysis, incorporating the technological dynamic of an evolving
electric power system with new and existing resources entering and leaving the
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system's infrastructure, allows decisionmakers to evaluate strategies with
complementary options. When comparing strategies which perform well for
both cost and emissions, it was found that significant opportunities for
emissions reduction existed, at well below the values set for externality
valuation. Externalities can play an important role, as a tie breaker, in electric
power systems planning. However, they must be derived from a knowledge of
the strategies, and resource combinations available to a given system. Once the
tradeoffs between costs and emissions are known, values can be selected which
signal the marketplace of the level of costs and emissions society is willing to
endure in the provision of electric service.
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